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RECRUITMENT AND APPOINTMENT OF FEDERAL
JUDGES
I. INTRODUCTION
The Omnibus Judgeship Act (the Act), enacted in October 1978,1 has
expanded the active federal judiciary by one-third with its creation of
152 new federal judgeships. For the Ninth Circuit, this provides an
increase of ten judgeships at the circuit court level and fifteen at the
district court level.2 The Act was a product of a House-Senate Confer-
ence Committee compromise; it represents the largest single increase in
federal judgeships in United States history and is the first increase since
1970.
3
The need to fill these new positions has renewed interest in a reform,
initiated by the Carter Administration in 1977, which may prove to be
of equal historical importance for the administration of justice. Specifi-
cally, President Carter became the first American President to utilize
merit selection principles4 in appointing federal judges.5 This reform
has important implications with respect to both the quality of the fed-
eral judiciary and the level of public confidence in the judicial process.
The extent to which this reform has replaced the traditional, highly
political selection process is demonstrated by the varying procedures by
which judgeships are being awarded under the Act.6
I. Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (amending 28
U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (1979)).
2. Id. §§ 1-3.
3. Congress Approves Legislation Creating 152 New Judgeships, 62 JUDICATURE 310
(1979).
4. In the literature associated with judicial selection reform, "merit selection" refers to
schemes that rely on independent commissions for recruiting and screening candidates.
Such commissions recommend candidates to the Chief Executive, who makes judicial ap-
pointments based on the Commission's findings. Proponents of such plans suggest that com-
missions should be nonpartisan bodies, composed of lawyers and non-lawyers. Nelson,
Carter's Merit Plan: A GoodFirst Step, 61 JUDICATURE 105, 107 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Nelson].
5. Williams, Federal Merit Selection Takes Root, 61 JUDICATURE 104 (1977).
6. The Act contains a merit provision requiring the President to promulgate "standards
and guidelines" for the selection of the new district court judges on the basis of merit. The
original House version required that formal merit selection procedures be established and
followed. The House version was intended to prompt the President to establish a formal
mechanism to fill district court vacancies similar to that already instituted to fill circuit court
vacancies. The compromise legislation omits any reference to establishing specific merit
selection procedures. As a result, the district positions are being filled by merit commissions
only where such bodies are voluntarily established by United States Senators. See, On The
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This essay will consider the recruitment and selection methods by
which the newly expanded federal bench is being staffed and will eval-
uate the progress being made by the merit reform movement. It will
also examine some key issues in the selection of federal judges.
II. THE PATRONAGE MODEL-ITS FRIENDS AND CRITICS
Merit selection of federal judges in its present stage of development
is best appreciated when compared to the system which it is gradually
replacing. Controversy concerning the manner by which federal judges
are selected is as old as our nation. At the Constitutional Convention
of 1789, judicial selection was the only topic related to the federal judi-
ciary that generated vigorous debate.7 The central issue was not
whether appointment was the proper method of selection, but whether
given the need for an independent judiciary,8 such appointive powers
should reside with the executive.9
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton contended that the appoin-
tive powers should be vested solely in the president.'0 To the contrary,
Benjamin Franklin, among others, maintained that the power should
reside only in the Senate." The present system, under which the Sen-
ate as a body must approve a President's appointment, 12 reflects the
resulting compromise and includes additional provisions that were ad-
Omnibus Judgeship Bill and Merit Selection, 62 JUDICATURE 4 (1978); Cohen, Judge Bill to
Test Merit Selection, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 9, 1978, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Cohen].
7. A. ASHMAN, J. ALFINI, J. LOBBERS & V. CONNELLY, THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT
SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ASHMAN & ALFINI].
8. Though the early 18th century witnessed a significant decline in the English monarch's
powers with respect to appointment and removal of judges, colonial judges were excluded
from, this increase in judicial independence. Prior to the American Revolution, they re-
mained mere adjuncts to the executive, dependent upon the King for their tenure and com-
pensation. Id.
9. Id.
10. H. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES, THE APPOINTING PROCESS 6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
CHASE].
11. Id.
12. Art. II, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The Presi-
dent shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
.. . Judges of the Supreme Court and all other Officers of the United States whose appoint-
ment are not herein otherwise provided for .. " The prevailing yiew that "other Officers"
includes district and circuit court judges is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 44 and 133, which pro-
vide that all circuit and district court judges be appointed with the advice and consent of the
Senate. CHASE, supra note 10, at 5.
It is not clear why the framers gave the Senate power to advise and consent to judicial
appointments. The manner by which the Senate was intended to discharge its duties is also
not settled. See Totenberg, Will Judges Be Chosen Rationally?, 60 JUDICATURE 92 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Totenberg]; CHASE, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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ded to safeguard judicial independence. 3
Today, debate about the selection of federal judges continues, and
ironically, still involves the extent to which the political interplay be-
tween the Executive and Senate has impacted the appointive process.
One proponent of reform has observed concerning the traditional proc-
ess:
The present federal judicial selection mechanism can best be character-
ized as overly political. It is far from the anticipations of the Constitu-
tion. It is highly enmeshed in the politics of the executive and legislative
branches. It is not conducive to impartiality or separation of governmen-
tal powers. More importantly, it does not assure the quality of justice
each citizen has a right to expect. The majority of federal judges today
are quite competent, but that does not suggest that we have the best bench
or that future selections will be as good.'4
The practices that inject politics into this process are the custom of
"senatorial courtesy" and its corollary of de facto senatorial appoint-
ment. They have drawn the greatest criticism. Senatorial courtesy in-
volves a custom whereby a Senator may prevent confirmation of a
nominee from his state. If a Senator from a state in which the vacancy
is to be filled indicates his disapproval prior to formal confirmation
proceedings, the Senate Judiciary Committee will generally defer to his
views and take no further action to confirm.' 5 The custom recognizes
the fact that a Senator from whose state the appointment is to be made
13. Art. III, § 1 of the Constitution provides: "The judges, both of the supreme and infer-
ior Courts shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
in Office."
14. Winters, Merit Selection of Federal Judges, in JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 186-
87 (G. Winters rev. ed. 1973).
15. An ex-Senator has summarized the process associated with senatorial courtesy as fol-
lows:
(1) The Senator or Senators from the state involved, if of the President's party, sug-
gest one (or at times more) candidates for the bench to the Attorney General and the
President. (If the state has no Senator of the President's party, the suggestions come
from the congressional delegation or other political allies of the President).
(2) The Department of Justice does a limited amount of screening for competence
and the FBI conducts a background check.
(3) A twelve-member ABA committee on the Federal Judiciary investigates and
reports on the qualifications of the nominee in confidence to the attorney general.
(4) In most instances, the Attorney General then submits the "senatorial nominee"
to the Senate for confirmation.
(5) The Senate Judiciary Committee holds a hearing if the Senators from the nomi-
nee's state have returned their "blue slips" indicating approval. . . . [The custom of
the Judiciary Committee is not to hold hearings until the slip is returned.
Tydings, Merit Selectionfor District Judges, 61 JUDICATURE 113 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Tydings].
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has a greater political interest in that appointment.' 6
Senatorial courtesy contemplates, therefore, that Senators, through
mutual deference, may protect their individual interests in judicial ap-
pointments. Given the legal requirement of Senate confirmation, the
practice assures that tie President will only make appointments that
are acceptable to the Senators whose interests in that appointment are
most vital. Such deference has been taken for granted when one or
both Senators are of the President's party. 7 Few instances exist in
which a Senator of the President's party has been unsuccessful in
blocking a nomination to a federal district judgeship in his own state.
18
With regard to circuit judgeships, however, senatorial courtesy has
been relevant only when the nominee has been from the objecting Sen-
ator's state. Circuit judgeships need not be apportioned among the
states in the circuit. 9 Therefore, candidates from all states in the cir-
cuit may be considered, and a prerogative of disapproval exists only in
favor of the Senator whose state produces the nominee.2
Senatorial courtesy has as its corollary a tradition, dating back to the
Washington administration, by which a Senator, if of the President's
party, can bring formidable power to bear on behalf of a particular
nomination.2' It has become common practice for the Attorney Gen-
eral, fully aware of senatorial courtesy, to consider primarily the wishes
of Senators of a given state in filling federal judicial vacancies. As a
result, a candidate's likelihood of appointment depends substantially
upon the degree to which he was supported by a Senator or the party
16. The ability to reward supporters with federal government posts can be of great politi-
cal value to Senators, who must cultivate support within their home states to ensure addi-
tional terms in office. Conversely, it damages a Senator if a President of his party ignores
him when making an appointment affecting the Senator's own state. The damage is greater
if the appointee is known to be a political opponent of the Senator. CHASE, supra note 10, at
7.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 9.
19. Id. at 43. Unlike districts, each circuit covers at least three states.
20. Id. at 44. There is, however, the phenomenon of "state representation." It refers to
the fact that frequently circuit court appointments are made in the states from which the
vacancy comes. This practice has apparently been institutionalized under President Carter's
commission system. See Goldman, Judicial Appointments to the United States Courts of Ap-
peal, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 186; Slotnick, What Panelists Are Saying About The Circuit Judge
Nominating Commission, 62 JUDICATURE 320, 322 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Slotnick].
21. CHASE, supra note 10, at 10. As Fletcher Rush, President of the American Judicature
Society explains with respect to district judgeships: "Although technically the President ap-
points district court judges with the advice and consent of the Senate, in fact, he relies on the
recommendations of Senators from the state in which the judicial vacancy exists. In effect
his designation is a confirmation of their choice." Rush, Ending Patronage In The Judiciary,
62 JUDICATURE 264 (1978).
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leaders of his state.2 2
While no single Senator necessarily controls each appellate judge-
ship, the selection of district judgeships has been an important source
of political patronage. Many Senators consider the selection of district
judges to be one of the duties they were elected to perform.23 Unfortu-
nately, as ex-Senator Joseph W. Tydings noted, "[o]penness and objec-
tivity are too often rare commodities under the system of senatorial
courtesy."
24
The traditional system, then, has been characterized by an undue re-
liance on candidates who emerge from political sources. It has been
criticized not for an inability to produce judges of outstanding ability
and character,25 but rather for the lack of uniformity in judicial quality
inherent in a recruitment and selection process so dependent upon po-
litical pressures.26 Further, according to proponents of reform, public
confidence suffers to the degree that federal judgeships are perceived to
be a form of political reward. "Citizens are entitled to know how these
judges [are] chosen. They should be confident that careful study and
investigations preceded a nomination, that objective criteria (not politi-
cal trade offs) were the basis for selecting our federal judges.
'2 7
Given that the federal judiciary plays a crucial role in our system of
governance,28 it seems logical that any recruitment and selection
22. In a concluding chapter to his thorough treatment of federal judicial appointment,
Professor Harold Chase observes that judicial selection has been made from a relatively
small pool of legal talent and that many attorneys have excluded themselves early in their
legal careers because they neither had the time nor the inclination to invest much of them-
selves in political activity. CHASE, supra note 10, at 197.
23. Tydings, supra note 15, at 113.
24. Id.
25. To so argue would be to ignore history. Griffin Bell is an obvious example. Bell, who
distinguished himself during his fifteen years on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, candidly
admits that political connections were a major factor in his being appointed to the federal
bench. He had managed John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign in Georgia, had been
close friends with the two Senators from Georgia and had managed the governor's election
campaign. L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1978, § I, at 1, col. 2-3. See also Totenberg, supra note 12, at
93.
26. As ex-Attorney General Herbert Brownell notes, "Senators are rarely free agents.
They have to respond to the suggestions of their own state or local leaderships. They have
fences to mend, constituencies to acknowledge as well as friends to reward." Brownell, Mov-
ing the Judicial Selection Process Into the Twentieth Century, 16 JUDGES' J. 23 (Summer
1977) [hereinafter cited as Brownell].
27. Tydings, supra note 15, at 118.
28. To a large extent, the federal judiciary determines the posture of American society.
Federal judges decide where children go to school, what movies people may see, where
people may live, where housing projects will be built; judges often rule on how public
hospitals are to be administered, how police and fire departments are to be run, how
private companies should hire people and myriad other major matters of public policy.
1038 LOYOL4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
method must have as its primary objective a federal bench occupied by
the finest possible judges. The importance of inspiring public confi-
dence is equally clear. It is not surprising, therefore, that during the
1976 presidential campaign, both candidates pledged to implement the
long-needed reform.29 Candidate Jimmy Carter asserted that "[a]U
federal judges . . . should be appointed strictly on the basis of merit
without any consideration of political aspect or influence. We can no
longer afford to treat the administration of justice as political pa-
tronage.
'30
The sections that follow consider the extent to which this goal has
been achieved within the federal judiciary, as demonstrated by the se-
lection procedures now required under the newly enacted Omnibus
Judgeship Act.
III. NOMINATING COMMISSIONS-THE KEYSTONE OF MERIT
REFORM
Of the methods being used to fill the newly created judgeships, those
relying on independent merit commissions,3 ' which recruit and screen
candidates for the bench, represent, in theory, the greatest departure
from the traditional patronage model. The benchmark of merit re-
form,32 such commissions presently operate as a continuation of both
the mandatory circuit plans and the voluntary district plans33 which
Totenberg, supra note 12, at 93.
29. Nelson, supra note 4, at 105; Carbon, The U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission
62 JUDICATURE 233 (1978).
30. 124 CONG. REC. H720 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (Rep. Seiberling quoting President
Carter's campaign speech). The literature addressing President Carter's merit plan contains
frequent reference to this statement. Various interpretations have been given. Reform pro-
ponents have consistently deemed it to be promissory. By contrast, former Attorney General
Griffin Bell has termed the statement "aspirational." Mann, Politics StilBest Route to U.S.
Bench, L.A. Times, Feb. 18, 1979, § I, at 16, col. 1; Nelson, supra note 4, at 105-06.
31. Under the provisions of the Omnibus Judgeship Act, the sections creating the 117 new
district positions did not take effect until President Carter promulgated "standards and
guidelines for the selection of nominees on the basis of merit." Neither the Act nor the
resulting executive order, however, mandate the use of merit commissions. Omnibus Judge-
ship Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 7a, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978). See also notes 4, 6 & 30
supra and accompanying text.
32. "The judicial nominating commission is the cornerstone of the merit selection plan.
Because the nominating commission has ultimate authority to determine which candidates
are qualified to hold judicial office, the effectiveness of the merit plan is dependent upon the
successful functioning of this body." ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 7, at 22.
33. In 1974, Florida Senators Chiles and Stone adopted a merit selection plan. As of late
1978, seventeen states had voluntarily implemented merit plans for the selection of federal
judges. Rush, Ending Patronage in the Judiciary, 62 JUDICATURE 264 (1978). A similar
trend began in the state systems with Missouri's innovative scheme in 1940. Alfini, The
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predate the Omnibus Act.
At the circuit level, merit selection was implemented in February,
1977, when President Carter acted on his campaign commitment by
establishing the Circuit Judge Nominating Commission through an ex-
ecutive order.34 However, the order limited its scope to circuit nomina-
tions. In deference to the entrenched political system,35 it left many
district appointments to traditional sources36 and was thus a partial dis-
appointment to merit proponents.37
Despite its limited scope, the February Order did represent a signifi-
cant departure from the status quo.38 The recruitment and selection
process it sets forth compares favorably with models proposed by at
least one leading proponent of reform,39 and is the prototype4 ° for the
process currently being used under the Omnibus Act to fill circuit posi-
tions.4'
Trend Toward Judicial Merit Selection, 13 TRIAL 41, 42-43 (Nov. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
Alfini].
34. Exec. Order No. 11,972, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1977) [hereinafter cited as February Order].
35. It is widely reported that in a pre-inaugural meeting with Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman James 0. Eastland, Carter made a major concession when he agreed not to re-
quire the use of nominating panels by Senators recommending district court judges. See,
e.g., Cohen, supra note 6, at 30, col. 1; 124 CONG. REC. H720 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1978) (Re-
marks of Rep. Seiberling concerning merit language and President Carter's confrontation
with hard political facts).
Judicial selection historian James Alfini explains:
[I]f President Carter had extended his merit plan to include United States district court
judges, he would have gone against a long standing practice. Not only would such a
move have been politically unwise in removing an important source of patronage from
individual senators, but it would have superseded the efforts of certain senators who
had established their own merit plans.
Alfini, supra note 33, at 43.
36. Officially, all of the approximately 400 district judgeships existing at the time of the
Carter-Eastland compromise remained subject to the traditional method. Voluntarily
adopted merit plans reduced this number. See note 36 infra and accompanying text; Judicial
Reform." Still No Verdict, LA. Times, Feb. 19, 1979, § 1, at 18, col. 2.
37. See Williams, supra note 5, at 104.
38. It should be noted, however, that at the time of the President's Order, Senators from
thirteen states had promised to implement or had already established some form of merit
plan. Tydings, supra note 15, at 113. See also note 33 supra and accompanying text.
39. The American Judicature Society (AJS) has developed and promoted various mea-
sures for improving the administration of justice. In 1977, the Society, a long-time propo-
nent of merit selection, proposed that federal judicial nominees be recruited, screened and
ranked by an independent body similar to those then operating in 28 states. See Nelson,
supra note 4, at 106 n.4; AJS Update, 60 JUDICATURE 306 (1977).
40. The commission concept, however, was not new to Carter. In 1971, as Governor of
Georgia, Carter adopted a nominating commission composed of lawyers and lay citizens,
which was responsible for recruiting and recommending for appointment those most quali-
fied for a judgeship. Alfini, supra note 33, at 42.
41. The May Order, which by its terms was to expire on December 31, 1978, has been
extended for a two year period. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (1978).
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As modified in May of 1978, the President's Order establishes a com-
mission composed of thirteen panels "each of which shall, upon the
request of the President, recommend for nomination as circuit judges
persons whose character, experience, ability and commitment to equal
justice under law, fully qualify them to serve in the Federal judici-
ary."
42
The panels are assigned one to each of the eleven circuits, with two
panels assigned to the geographically large Fifth and Ninth Circuits.
43
The membership of each panel consists of a "[c]hairman and such
other members as the President may appoint."44 The order further
mandates that each panel shall include "members of both sexes...
members of minority groups and . . . at least one lawyer from each
State within a panel's area of responsibility."
45
Circuit panels begin functioning when notified by the President that
the panel's assistance is desired to aid the President in discharging "his
constitutional responsibility and discretion to select a nominee to fill a
vacancy or vacancies on a United States Court of Appeals.
'46
President Carter's circuit plan contemplates a commission active in
pre-selection recruitment activity as well as the ultimate screening.47
Thus, when notified by the President,
The panel shall: give public notice4'. . . of the vacancies within the rele-
vant geographic area, inviting suggestions as to potential nominees;...
42. Id. § 1.
43. Id.
44. Id. § 2.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 3.
47. The recruitment function contemplated by the order underscores a distinction be-
tween the role of the commission and that of the American Bar Association Standing Com-
mittee on the Federal Judiciary. The latter body, which merely "reacts" to the names
submitted to it by the Justice Department, plays no role in recommending names for judicial
positions. See Rosenbaum, Implementing Federal Merit Selection, 61 JUDICATURE 125, 126
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Rosenbaum]; Nelson, supra note 4, at 106. The ABA Commit-
tee's influence and stature in the judge-screening process has varied with each administra-
tion. Its evaluation of senatorial recommendations has often resulted in negotiations with
the Justice Department. Totenberg, supra note 12, at 96; CHASE, supra note 10, at 20-21; S.
GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, THE FEDERAL COURTS As A POLITICAL SYSTEM 47-57 (1976).
The future role of the ABA Committee with respect to the judicial confirmations occasioned
by the Omnibus Act is somewhat uncertain. Nat'l L.J., Oct. 16, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
48. Notices in major daily newspapers and legal periodicals are typical methods. See,
e.g., Carbon, The U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission, 62 JUDICATURE 233, 238
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Carbon]. Candidates for a vacancy will, however, only be con-
sidered from a specified state even though circuit courts are putatively regional. The con-
finement of a panel's search to a single state has been criticized by at least one noted
commentator. See Slotnick, supra note 20, at 322.
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conduct inquiries to identify4 9 those persons among the potential nomi-
nees who are well qualified to serve as a United States Circuit Judge [and
to] [r]eport5° to the President, within the time specified. . its recommen-
dations as to the persons whom the panel considers best qualified to fill
the vacancy or vacancies.
51
The order also makes explicit the goal of a more diverse federal bench
by encouraging each panel "to seek out and identify well qualified wo-
men and members of minority groups as potential nominees. 52
By contrast, the district judgeship positions created by the Omnibus
Act are being awarded pursuant to an executive order53 that provides
that the Attorney General, in assisting the President "shall receive rec-
ommendations. . . from any person, commission or organization. The
use of commissions to notify the public of vacancies and to make rec-
ommendations for district judge is encouraged."54
While the failure to mandate the use of merit commissions is con-
spicuous, this November Order does evidence a continued commitment
to a judiciary of uniformly high quality and of a more diverse composi-
tion. For example, the November order further provides that the At-
torney General, before making recommendations, shall consider
whether "[p]ublic notice of the vacancy has been given and an affirma-
tive effort has been made, in the case of each vacancy, to identify quali-
49. The particular screening process employed by each circuit panel varies. Typically,
questionnaires, writing samples, personal references and personal interviews are a major
part of the evaluation process. See Carbon, supra note 48, at 238; Fish, Questioning Judicial
Candidates, 62 JUDICATURE 8, 16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fish].
50. The President's February Order required that the names of those recommended be
kept confidential. Critics quickly noted that public confidence could only suffer as a result.
The superseding May Order omits that requirement. The current procedure is to inform the
public of those recommended when the President is informed. The extent to which the
Commission's actual proceedings should be confidential remains an open question. Carbon,
supra note 48, at 235.
51. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949, § 3 (1978).
52. Id. § 4. Certain experience requirements may undermine the order's affirmative ac-
tion component. A guideline issued by the Attorney General's office suggests that "a person
who has less than fifteen years of legal experience ... should be considered only in unusual
circumstances and if exceptionally meritorious." Slotnick, supra note 20, at 323 (citing
Memorandum from Assoc. Attorney Gen., April 22, 1977, at 7). As Professor Elliott E.
Slotnick has suggested, a rigid application of this guideline is inconsistent with the attain-
ment of a more representative federal bench. Id. Professor Slotnick is joined by critics who
emphasize that such an experience requirement discriminates against black and women law-
yers, many of whom have just recently entered the legal profession due to past discrimina-
tion. Proponents of such a requirement contend that the requirement ensures thorough trial
experience. "New Politics" Helps Pick Judges, L.A. Times, Feb. 20, 1979, § I, at 5, col. 4.
53. Exec. Order No. 12,097, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,455 (1978).
54. Id. §§ 1-102, 1-103 (1978).
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fled candidates including women and members of minority groups."-,-
Further, the Attorney General is to determine that the selection process
was "fair and reasonable" and that persons recommended meet "stan-
dards for evaluation" similar to those required of circuit nominees.-
6
Notwithstanding the fact that it establishes a basic format by which
untraditional candidates will be more likely to receive consideration,
the November Executive Order leaves open to debate the extent to
which patronage will continue to play a role in the selection process.
The Omnibus Act's requirement that the President promulgate "stan-
dards and guidelines" for the selection of district judges presumably
gave him or her the authority to mandate merit commissions in districts
where they had not already been voluntarily adopted.-7 Yet, in appar-
ent deference to Congress, President Carter displayed a continuing re-
luctance to require commissions for other than circuit vacancies.-8
Other factors also suggest the continued vitality of the patronage
model. In addition to the November Order's failure to require merit
commissions, the process continues to allow senators to submit only
one name to the President. 9 While senatorial courtesy is regarded by
some as an anachronism,6" and its future placed in question by recent
developments, 61 its demise is by no means certain.
55. Id. § 1-104(a). This apparent mandate of affirmative action may be of diminished
force. Certain legal experience requirements set forth by the Attorney General's office could
substantially narrow the pool of eligible women and minorities. With respect to the selec-
tion of district judges, twelve to fifteen years of legal experience is a prerequisite subject to
only rare exception. As a result of past discrimination, women and minority groups have
only, in recent years, entered the legal profession. Consistency would seem to require that
any experience requirement not assume talismanic importance. See Cohen, Playing Political
Games with Judgeships, L.A. Times, Nov. 15, 1978, § II, at 7, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as
Playing Political Games]. See note 52 supra and authority cited therein.
56. Exec. Order No. 12,097, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,455, §§ 1-104(b), 1-104(c) (1978).
57. The Act's language was flexibly worded so as not to limit the avenues available to the
President. See notes 6 & 31 supra and authority cited therein. Indeed, given Carter's com-
mitment to merit selection, it was speculated that the President would rely on the Act's merit
selection language to extend his merit system to district court appointments. See, e.g., Co-
hen, supra note 36, at 30, col. 1.
58. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
59. See Exec. Order No. 12,097, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,455 (1978). See Playing Political Games,
supra note 55, at 7, col. 4.
60. Encouraging an end to the custom, political scientist Sheldon Goldman likens the
'blue slip' practice to the political enemies lists that were discredited during the Watergate
scandal. Goldman, .4 Profile of Carter's JudicialNominees, 62 JUDICATURE 247, 254 (1978).
[hereinafter cited as Goldman].
61. Senator Edward Kennedy, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has in-
dicated that he will alter the system of senatorial courtesy. Under the new procedure, a
Senator's refusal to return his blue slip would result in a committee vote as to further pro-
ceedings and not a unilateral tabling of a nomination as under the traditional practice. The
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As of November 1978, 55 of the 117 new district court positions
stood to be filled without the aid of a voluntary merit commission sys-
tem.62 This fact, while a source of discomfort to proponents of selec-
tion reform, is made somewhat less threatening by several factors.
First, President Carter and former Attorney General Griffin Bell have
continued to wage their "quiet campaign," encouraging Senators to
adopt merit panels, or at least to produce more representative lists of
candidates.3 Second, the administrative burden' created by the Act,
when combined with a greater public recognition of the commission
mechanism, should prompt a continued adoption of merit commis-
sions. Third, the House Judiciary Committee, a strong supporter of
merit selection, can be expected to monitor closely the implementation
of the Act's merit provision and to advocate changes where needed.65
Finally, Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, has pledged that candidate qualifications will be thoroughly
scrutinized during the confirmation process.66 He has also pledged to
end the time-honored practice of allowing a home state Senator the
power of absolute veto over prospective federal judge nominees.67
Rather than effecting automatic nonconfirmation, a Senator's blue slip
protest will now prompt a Committee vote as to further action to be
taken.68 While senatorial courtesy is not completely discarded, the
measure will undoubtedly lend further prestige to President Carter's
informal reform tactics.69
There remains strong opposition to the merit commission concept ev-
idenced by both the Omnibus Act's weakened merit provision and the
President's compromising executive orders, Congressmen and politi-
cians, of course, wish to retain their capabilities of rewarding political
announcement of this controversial change was met with mixed reaction. L.A. Daily J., Jan.
26, 1979, at 1, col. 5. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
62. See Playing Political Games, supra note 55, at col. 5.
63. See Tydings, supra note 15, at 118; Losing to Patronage, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1979, at
20, col. 1.
64. See Tydings, supra note 15, at 114, 118; Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1979, at 20, col. I.
65. See Playing Political Games, supra note 55, at col. 5.
66. Cohen, supra note 6, at 30, col. 1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. The scope of the reform measures being proposed by Senator Kennedy reach well
beyond senatorial courtesy. A preliminary version of legislation currently being drafted by
Senator Kennedy suggests that he is planning a major reform of the federal judiciary system.
The proposal's most novel concepts include a time limit on Congressional action on requests
for new federal judges, the creation of a high level council to study the needs of the federal
justice system, and provisions regarding judicial discipline and tenure. Nat'l L.J., Jan. 8,
1979, at 3, col. 1.
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allies. A more defensible criticism of the merit commission addresses
public accountability. Opponents have argued that such a system re-
places identifiable decision makers, who are directly responsible to
their constituents, with political appointees having no formal political
responsibilities. These critics, then, do not view nominating commis-
sions as ensurers of a more capable judiciary.7" Studies to date have
declined to render a final verdict concerning President Carter's Circuit
Judge Nominating Commission or the senatorial commissions cur-
rently in use. Those of Professor Sheldon Goldman,7' Professor Elliot
E. Slotnick,71 and others73 do highlight certain areas, however, that will
continue to be scrutinized in measuring the reform's progress. In rec-
ognition of the "undeniable" trend toward acceptance of the merit
commission concept,74 these areas are surveyed in the sections that fol-
low.
IV. MERIT PLAN COMPONENTS-MEASURING REFORM
As has been seen, the interrelated themes of public confidence, access
to the bench, and judicial quality pervade the continuing debate about
judicial selection reform. With reference to these themes, scrutiny of
the commission's concept has necessarily addressed the facets of panel
composition, selection criteria, and confidentiality. The imperatives
that have directed argument have been identified by Ashman and Al-
fini in their comprehensive empirical analysis of various state nominat-
ing commissions. They observe:
In carrying out its sensitive recruiting, screening, and nominating tasks, a
commission must operate in a manner that ensures the best potential judi-
cial talent available is nominated, without compromising the public's re-
spect and trust. Toward this end, a commission's composition and its
operating and evaluating procedures are of critical importance in assess-
ing the effectiveness of a merit selection plan.
75
A. Panel Composition
Given that diversity and public confidence are closely linked to the
success of merit reform, two aspects of panel composition are notewor-
thy. The first involves the partisanship of panel members, the second
the role of the non-lawyer.
70. See Cohen, supra note 6, at 30, col. 2.
71. See Goldman, supra note 60, at 250-54 (1978).
72. Slotnick, supra note 20.
73. See, e.g., Carbon, supra note 48; Rosenbaum, supra note 47.
74. Alfini, supra note 33, at 41.
75. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 7, at 227.
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As the chief proponents of merit reform, the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA) and the American Judicature Society (AJS) have consist-
ently stressed that a decision by a bipartisan commission will enjoy
greater legitimacy than one produced by a partisan body. Indeed, they
suggest that, ideally, such panels should be nonpartisan.7 6 Yet, as to
the partisanship of circuit commission members, the relevant executive
order77 is noticeably silent.
The overwhelming majority of individuals who have served on the
Circuit Judge Nominating Commission have been of the President's
party. A recent comparison of panel composition in the Sixth and
Eighth Circuits revealed that the former comprised two Republicans
and nine Democrats while the latter was composed entirely of Demo-
crats and attracted substantial criticism for its single party member-
ship.79 Further, a study by Elliot E. Slotnick of the Ohio State
University's political science department found that of the panel mem-
bers responding, 44% indicated they participated in President Carter's
election campaign and 65.4% said they supported Carter before the
Democratic National Convention.""
With respect to results achieved by a given panel, however, it bears
emphasis that the key issue is the extent to which political acceptability
was a factor in the recommendation of a candidate. Notwithstanding
the absence of an executive mandate, panels have given little or no
weight to an applicant's political background.81 Similarly, in the semi-
nal study of state nominating commissions, authors Ashman and Alfini
conclude that "political influences are less prevalent and are of less
consequence to a commission which is bi-partisan in nature.""2
Whether final recommendations are significantly affected by the par-
tisan asymmetry of panel membership is difficult to determine.8 3 The
more immediate issue speaks to public acceptance of the commission
concept. Certainly, a selection plan that is successful in minimizing the
76. See CHASE, supra note 10, at 73; Nelson, supra note 4, at 107.
77. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (1978); See Nelson, supra note 4, at 107.
78. Carbon, supra note 48, at 244.
79. Id.
80. Slotnick, supra note 20, at 322; Cohen, supra note 6, at 30, col. 1. A Justice Depart-
ment survey rendered similar results. Id.
81. Cohen, supra note 6, at 30. Rather, a recent survey suggests that panels were most
concerned with a candidate's character, moral courage, integrity and open-mindedness.
Slotnick, supra note 20, at 322. See also Carbon, supra note 48, at 241; Haskin, Serving on
the Circuit Judge Nominating Commission's Third Circuit Panel, A.B.A.J. 575, 576 (April
1978).
82. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 7, at 78.
83. Carbon, supra note 48, at 244.
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importance of a candidate's political background, may discourage pub-
lic confidence if the panels themselves become politicized. In this re-
gard, Professor Goldman's suggestion that at least one or two members
of the opposition party be routinely included 4 in panel memberships
constitutes a minimum step toward ensuring public confidence.
Quotas on party affiliation are equally advisable with respect to the
various voluntary plans now operating at the district level. Senator Jo-
seph W. Tydings' study of the voluntary plans that existed as of late
1977 revealed that only Ohio and Pennsylvania formally provided for
bipartisan membership.8
In light of traditional merit reform theory, the second noteworthy
aspect of commission composition relates to the role of the non-lawyer.
As early as 1931, proponents of merit reform suggested that candidates
be nominated by commissions composed not only of judges and law-
yers but also of non-lawyers.8 6 Missouri became the first state to adopt
a merit plan in 1940 and included equal numbers of lawyers and non-
lawyers plus one member of the judiciary in its panel.8 7
Lay participation is considered important for at least two reasons.
First, judicial panels composed of lay members will be more closely
identified with the citizenry.88 One commissioner has observed that
"[the basic role of nonlawyers is to ensure that the public's expecta-
tions are influential. The lay person has an extra responsibility for such
things as affirmative action and breaking traditions that go unques-
tioned." 9
Second, though lawyers are best qualified to determine whether a
candidate has demonstrated an ability to deal with complex legal is-
sues, lay persons can be "as perceptive as lawyers about people and
equally adept in evaluating available information." 90 For example, lay
persons are as qualified as lawyers to ascertain such important judicial
qualities as the willingness to consider fully both sides of a debatable
proposition, the ability to be even-tempered, fair and impartial, and the
84. Goldman, supra note 60, at 254.
85. Tydings, supra note 15, at 117. California's voluntary plan will remain bipartisan as
long as Senators Cranston and Hayakawa continue to cooperate despite being from different
political parties. Id.
86. Nelson, supra note 4, at 109.
87. Id.
88. Tydings, supra note 15, at 116-17.
89. Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 127.
90. See Nelson, supra note 4, at 109-10 (quoting Robertson & Gordon, Merit Screening of




capacity to conceptualize complex relationships. 91
Thus, merit theorists have stressed that to keep the narrow-minded
from the bench, the panel itself should reflect in its membership a di-
verse balance of perspectives.9" As Glen R. Winters states: "An all-
lawyer commission would tend to exaggerate the purely technical skills
of a good lawyer and the broader viewpoint of the layman or non-legal
considerations of general intelligence, education, personal integrity and
other human qualities is needed.
'93
The degree to which lay participation will be stressed by the Carter
Administration in staffing the circuit commission remains unclear. A
comparison of the initial executive orders with the more recent ones
suggests that the role of the lay citizen has been considerably reduced.
Specifically, President Carter's initial order required that panels be
composed of approximately equal numbers of lawyers and non-law-
yers.94 It further provided that each state within a panel's circuit be
represented by at least one "resident."95 His superseding order of May
1978, however, has no requirement concerning the ratio of lawyers to
non-lawyers, and it specifies that at least one "lawyer" shall represent
each state within the circuit. 6 Whether these modifications presage
less lay participation remains to be seen.
Concerning the different district court voluntary plans, Senator Tyd-
ings' pre-Omnibus Act comparison of thirteen merit schemes found
non-lawyer participation common.97 Membership is often designed to
correspond to the state's populace with respect to race, sex, hometown,
occupation and party affiliation.98 In addition, several plans seek to
have a non-lawyer majority on the panels.99
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. G. WINTERS, The Merit Planfor Judical Selection and Tenure-Its Historical Develop-
ment in JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 29, 41 (G. Winters ed. 1973). But see Slotnick,
supra note 20, at 321 ("To a statistically significant degree, we found that attorneys claimed
to place less emphasis than layman on recruitment recommendations from various groups
and individuals, including public officials, labor unions, civil rights groups, and non-legal
and professional associations.")
94. Exec. Order No. 11,972, 3 C.F.R. 96 (1977).
95. Id. See Carbon, supra note 48, at 234.
96. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949 (1978).
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B. Selection Criteria
1. The Basic Standards
The basic standards by which judicial candidates are to be evaluated
in filling positions under the Omnibus Act are set forth in the respective
Executive Orders that have implemented the circuit and district proce-
dures. Common to these orders are the requirements that the proposed
nominees be members in good standing of at least one state bar, that
they possess and have reputations for integrity and good character, and
that they have demonstrated outstanding legal ability and commitment
to equal justice under the law. 00
The more recent order that embodies the "standards and guidelines"
promulgated for district evaluations is more particular in certain areas.
For example, "substantial legal experience, ability to deal with complex
legal problems, aptitude for legal scholarship and writing and familiar-
ity with courts and their processes" are listed as evidence of "outstand-
ing legal ability and competence."' 0'° Further, with obvious reference
to the trial function, criteria for district positions include "the ability
and willingness to manage complicated pretrial and trial proceedings,
including the ability to weigh conflicting testimony and make factual
determinations, and to communicate skillfully with jurors and wit-
nesses." 1
02
As noted above, for district positions, these characteristics may be
determined without resort to an independent panel but in theory must
be the basis for a recommendation in any event. 0 3 Understandably,
these exemplary criteria have met with little criticism from proponents
of selection reform. The degree to which these standards are enforced
by the Attorney General at the district level will undoubtedly be sub-
ject to scrutiny by proponents and critics alike. As of the date of writ-
ing, President Carter has made four district appointments under the
Omnibus Act, including a woman and a black. Recommended by Sen-
ator Edward Kennedy, all four have impressive credentials' °4 that ap-
pear to comport well with the dictates of Carter's standards and
guidelines order.
100. Exec. Order No. 12,059, 43 Fed. Reg. 20,949, § 4 (1978); Exec. Order No. 12,097, 43
Fed. Reg. 52,455, §§ 1-2 (1978).
101. Exec. Order No. 12,097, 43 Fed. Reg. 52,455, §§ 1-2 (1978).
102. Id.
103. See generally note 54 supra and accompanying text.




2. Merit Commissions and the Screening Process
The purported desirability of merit commissions is premised, in part,
on an ability to ascertain the required attributes of a potential judge in
an environment free from inappropriate political influences. 0 5 How-
ever, the pre-Act evolution of Carter's merit selection at the circuit level
has been attended by controversy concerning the extent to which inap-
propriate criteria have controlled panel recommendations. The issues
raised highlight problems inherent in the reform's campaign for public
acceptance.
In the absence of specific guidelines, each panel constituting the Cir-
cuit Judge Nominating Commission has adopted different procedures
and criteria for selecting circuit court judges. 6 The abstract criteria
listed in the executive orders, while easy to state and agree upon, are by
no means self-evident in a given candidate. As Professor Maurice Ro-
senburg of Columbia Law School has observed, "as to the way to meas-
ure the amount of any given virtue a candidate possesses, there is only
bafflement."'1 7
In determining the qualifications of a particular candidate, certain
sources of information have been used. For instance, in the Sixth Cir-
cuit, applicant questionnaires and contacts with listed references pro-
vide much of the principal information.0 8 Authored opinions and law
review articles may also be helpful in appraising an applicant's writing
ability.' 9 A final source of data used in this circuit is the candidate
interview." 0 It is the aspect of selection procedure least cloaked in con-
fidentiality."'I As the most visible indication of the character of com-
mission deliberation, the interview process has generated controversy
in several instances."
2
The Eighth Circuit panel, which convened in April of 1978 to fill a
vacancy created by the appointment of William Webster to the Direc-
torship of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, experienced difficulty
with the interview process. Some panel members characterized their
peers' questions as poorly worded, unnecessarily embarrassing, or sim-
105. See generally notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text.
106. Id. See Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 126-27.
107. Rosenburg, The Qualities of Justices-Are They Strainable? 44 TEx. L. REv. 1063,
1068 (1966).
108. Carbon, supra note 48, at 238.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Fish, supra note 49, at 8, 11 (dealing with experience of Fourth Circuit
candidates).
112. See, e.g., Carbon, supra note 48, at 240-41.
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ply improper.1 3 Further, the panel's impressions of the interview pro-
cess and those of the applicants often differed. 14
Several candidates were asked about contemporary issues such as the
Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, and first amendment freedoms. 1
5
Regarding such questions, panel members have since emphasized that
their objective was to evaluate the applicant's demeanor and legal rea-
soning processes and not to ascertain his personal predisposition."
6
One candidate left the interview process convinced that his position on
the Equal Rights Amendment had been an important factor." 7 That
two candidates who opposed the amendment were recommended to the
President suggests otherwise. 18 However, a candidate who was not se-
lected for recommendation made public his contempt. His letter to a
St. Louis newspaper reported that he had been excluded for personal
opinions rather than evaluated on the basis of judicial competence., " 9
A similar circumstance occurred in the Fourth Circuit nearly a year
earlier. Campaigning against the panel and its then novel role, both
Senators from North Carolina publicly complained that interviewed
candidates were "questioned about their philosophical beliefs and not
about their legal experience."' 20 To the same effect, a scathing column
in a Washington newspaper characterized as "baffling" the replacement
of panel questions concerning judicial process or judicial temperament
with inquiries on substantive areas such as abortion, women's rights,
state sovereignty, and the Bakke case.' 2' In the wake of the Fourth
Circuit controversy, Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Meador
warned that while "attitudes" or "ideological factors" or views on spe-
cific public issues may be germane to the selection process, it is inap-
propriate for panel members to interrogate a prospective nominee
about them.'
22
Speaking directly to the issue of the merit commission's proper func-
tion, the Justice Department's distinction between appropriate and in-
appropriate interview questions is not a clear one. 23 As implemented,
however, it is certain that the interview process is supposed to display







120. Fish, supra note 49, at 11, 13.
121. Id. at 11.




some measure of restraint at the interview stage. In this regard, former
Attorney General Griffin Bell disapproved of the practice of asking po-
tential nominees "a lot of questions about philosophy-the kind of
things they wouldn't answer if they were in the Senate."' 24
Reasoning that limitations on the scope of permissible questions ex-
acerbates the already difficult task of finding the abstract judicial quali-
ties set forth in the executive order, Professor Fish of Duke University
argues that the spectrum of questions should be "wide-ranging" and
"not narrow and technical." 2 5 He notes that the appeals courts are in
reality the "final decision making institutions for virtually all cases in-
cluding those of significant political content."' 26 They are involved in
non-static and sometimes political law making which requires the crea-
tive use of discretion. Ascertaining the degree to which this aptitude
exists in a given candidate, the argument continues, requires the best
available evidence including wide-ranging and searching interview
questions. Rather than prohibiting panel use of a broad range of ques-
tions that are admittedly germane to the task before them, Professor
Fish recommends that the spectrum of acceptable questions remain
wide, but subject to a monitoring function performed by the chairper-
son. 127
More recently, an Eighth Circuit panel member observed that, al-
though he was initially offended when candidates were questioned
about the Equal Rights Amendment, "the answers were so illuminating
that I concluded that the question itself is not improper." He added,
however, that "it would be improper for a panelist to make a decision
on a candidate based upon the candidate's stand on ERA."'
128
Central to the success of the commission's concept in the selection of
federal judges is its operation "with sufficient dignity so as not to cause
capable lawyers to refuse to be candidates for judicial office and in a
manner which will ensure that the selection process will deserve and
receive public trust."' 29 Thus, if legitimate screening and interview
objectives escape the public awareness, skepticism will hinder accept-
ance of the commission concept.
This can be viewed as part of the larger problem, mentioned earlier,
of differing screening standards used among the various panels.130 A
124. L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1978, § I, at 1, cc'. 2.
125. Fish, supra note 49, at 15.
126. Id. at 14.
127. Id. at 14-17.
128. Carbon, supra note 48, at 241.
129. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 7, at 41.
130. See Carbon, supra note 48, at 244.
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lack of uniformity will result in lowered expectations regarding panel
integrity among the public. But with uniformity the public should be
afforded "some insight into [objective] qualities deemed by the com-
mission as a requisite to a judgeship."'' To this end, the results of a
survey of the Nominating Commission representatives are enlighten-
ing.' 32 A comparison of two of those panels participating indicates the
relative importance of several factors in their evaluation of candidates.
Among these potential factors that could be considered in the Sixth
Circuit were age, sex, race, physical and mental health, writing ability,
religion, party affiliation, education, character and personality, profes-
sional experience, and community and public service. Health, charac-
ter and personality were given the greatest emphasis while party
affiliation and religion played virtually no role.' 33 In addition, the
Sixth Circuit panel placed primary emphasis on an applicant's writing
ability, while the Eighth Circuit gave community and public service
greater preference. Both panels believed that age would be an impor-
tant factor "only if the candidate were near or over sixty."'
1 34
As for affirmative action, both panels, aware of President Carter's
commitment to a more diverse federal bench, gave "some additional
preference" to women and members of minority groups when candi-
dates were otherwise equally qualified. 35 Panel representatives indi-
cated that education and professional experience were additional
factors to be considered, but they were not decisive.' 36 Those inter-
viewed also noted, however, that the "weight awarded each criterion
varied with the individual applicant and his or her professional posi-




Described by one commentator as an area "fraught with contro-
versy,"' 139 confidentiality of panel proceedings involves several compet-
ing interests. "There is first the public's right to know as much as
possible about the applicants, their background and credentials, and
131. Id.
132. Id. at 243-245.
133. Id. at 241.
134. Id.




139. Id. at 245.
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the panel's rationale in making final selections." 4 ' Opposing the pub-
lie's right is that of the applicant to be assured anonymity and spared
the embarrassment of rejection. The panel also has an interest in con-
ducting its business in an atmosphere free of external political and spe-
cial interest pressures.
141
The current practice is to make known the names of those finally
recommended to the President.'4 2 Those rejected presumably remain
unpublicized, those selected are honored,'43 and public confidence is
enhanced when the President appoints a judge from a list naming those
candidates found to be superior. 44
As to "actual panel deliberations and all communications between
commissioners, between commissioners and a candidate, and between
a commissioner and any person or organization with respect to the can-
didate's qualifications," the need for confidentiality is clear according
to one commentator.
45
The recent AJS study suggests that few panel members would argue
for open meetings but that many see advantage in communicating with
the public to some extent before releasing their recommendations to the
President." Orientation sessions to which the press and public are in-
vited and which precede the actual panel deliberations are gaining ac-
ceptance.' 47 However, in the absence of specific guidelines from the
Department of Justice, the nature and amount of information that may
be released after a panel completes its recommendations continues to
pose a problem.'
48
The goal of educating the public concerning panel practices is impor-
tant in order to combat the negative inferences that attended the fait
accompli atmosphere of the former selection process. 149 However, this
goal may not be fully realized because panel members are reluctant to
disclose identities and credentials of capable applicants; they fear that
such disclosures will breach confidential relationships established be-
tween the panel and such candidates and thereby jeopardize the success
of the selection process. 150
140. Id.; Nelson, supra note 4, at Ill (quoting ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 7, at 230).
141. Carbon, supra note 48, at 245; Nelson, supra note 4, at 111.
142. See Carbon, supra note 48, at 235.
143. Nelson, supra note 4, at 111.
144. See Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 128.
145. Nelson, supra note 4, at 111.
146. Carbon, supra note 48, at 245.
147. Id. at 237-38.
148. Id. at 245.
149. See Tydings, supra note 15, at 118.
150. See generally Carbon, supra note 48, at 245 n.33.
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The balance between these potentially conflicting objectives should,
however, be tipped in favor of public disclosure. The public's "right to
know," which has recently experienced greater recognition in the
courts, should play a significant part in determining disclosure guide-
lines that should be followed in the judicial merit selection process.' 5 I
V. CONCLUSION
A leading merit reform historian has observed, that "[i]f the merit
plan is to continue to be touted as a major reform, it is important that
we begin to document the successes and failures of presently existing
plans."' 52 In this spirit, it is appropriate to acknowledge that, at least at
the circuit level, the selection process is experiencing unprecedented
openness. As distinguished from what was formerly a function of sena-
torial prerogative, the commission concept contemplates that anyone
can apply or recommend others for consideration.'53 As public confi-
dence increases, such access will prove to be the reform's salient fea-
ture.
At the district level, the continued adoption of voluntary merit plans
combined with the administration's vigilance in demanding "represen-
tative lists of candidates"' 54 should encourage a broader avenue to the
expanded federal bench than that traditionally allowed. Already, a
substantially larger proportion of blacks and women have been placed
on the federal district bench by President Carter than were placed by
other administrations. 155
Superficially inviting a less sanguine posture for proponents of selec-
tion reform, a study of Carter's pre-Omnibus Act appointments also
suggests that party affiliation will continue to play a role in the selec-
tion of federal judges. Both those nominees produced by the circuit
commission and those by the various methods at the district level
tended to be prominent party activists. 56
With respect to President Carter's district appointments, Professor
151. See generally Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Landmark Communica-
tions, Inc. v. Virginia., 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S: 748 (1976).
152. Alfini, supra note 33, at 42.
153. Carbon, supra note 48, at 243.
154. President Carter has made public his dissatisfaction with the lists of candidates he
has received from certain Senators in preparing to fill the positions created under the Omni-
bus Act. Senator Harry Byrd, for example, submitted a list of ten candidates which con-
tained no women or minorities. Nat'l L.J., Jan. 29, 1979, at 20.
155. Goldman, supra note 60, at 249.
156. Id. at 251.
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Goldman observed that, "[a]lthough it is unlikely that previous politi-
cal activity and political connections were [a] prime consideration, it is
clear that well qualified candidates with prominent partisan activism or
connections usually had an edge over those without it."' 57 Further,
with few exceptions, those selected from the merit commission recom-
mendations to fill circuit positions had impressive records of service to
the Democratic Party. 5 s As with former administrations, at least
ninety percent of those appointed have been of the President's party. 159
Arguing for reform in 1972, Glen R. Winters stated:
From the time of President Cleveland to the present administration, over
90 percent of those appointed have been from the party of the President
S.,. .. It is a fundamental premise in our system of government that the
judiciary functions best when it is nonpartisan and unattached to either
the executive or legislative branch. Others contend that the President has
the right to inject his particular judicial philosophy into the judiciary
through his nominations. Unfortunately, a corollary of this view is that
only those who agree with the President are qualified. Thus a potential
judge clearly superior to another nominee might be excluded because his
interpretations are not as "close" to the President's.' 6°
Professor Sheldon Goldman predicts that Democrats with a record
of "party activity and/or political connections will continue even under
'merit selection' to have the inside track, all other things being approxi-
mately equal."' 61 Assuming there is a significant correlation between
party affiliation and certain judicial decisional tendencies, 62 the 152
157. 1d. at 250. It should be noted that merit commissions merely aid the President by
submitting lists of well qualified persons. Ultimately, however, appointments are an execu-
tive function. Even assuming a politically disinterested merit panel, therefore, partisanship
can be a factor. The critical distinction, in theory, is that such considerations occur only
after merit has been independently established. In this regard, there is disagreement as to
whether panels should rank the nominees they send to the President. See Rosenbaum, supra
note 47, at 125-26; Goldman, supra note 60, at 254.
158. Goldman, supra note 60, at 252.
159. Id. at 251.
160. G. WINTERS, Merit Selection for Federal Judges, in JUDICAL SELECTION AND TEN-
URE 183-84 (G. Winters ed. 1973). However, Professor Joel Grossman has suggested:
[T]he argument against eliminating partisanship from the recruitment equation need
not rest entirely on a negative basis. It could be argued that considerations of partisan-
ship (excluding only the more blatant uses of it) make a positive contribution to the
nationality of the selection process. First they insure the selection process will be indi-
rectly responsive to the popular sentiment. More important, they insure that the impor-
tant question of the social and political philosophies of the judicial candidate will be
considered.
• * * Although partisanship may be a pernicious influence in the actual rendering of
judicial decisions, it may also be a desireable feature of the recruitment process ....
GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES 219 (1965) (emphasis in original).
161. Goldman, supra note 60, at 252-53.
162. For example, judges who affiliate with the Democratic Party tend to be more liberal
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new lifetime judgeships represent an opportunity for the Carter Ad-
ministration to fundamentally reshape the federal judiciary.
63
Purist merit theory would suggest that partisanship should play no
role in the selection of federal judges.'" Yet, the literature is replete
with more realistic analysis. As Dean Dorothy Nelson has written,
"[pierhaps no judicial selection plan will ever be entirely free from po-
litical influences, but any plan should be free of such unsavory by-
products of partisan politics as the 'reward system' whereby individuals
not otherwise qualified are rewarded for their service or contributions
to the party."'' 65 Similarly, former Attorney General Herbert Brownell
has asserted that "[p]olitics is an essential element of any democratic
government. To deny its existence is to bury one's head in the sand."'1
66
Thus, in deference to the nature of our democratic society, the battle-
lines of the merit reform movement have, for the time being, been
drawn by the distinction between partisanship and patronage. 67 The
Carter Administration has been successful in curbing the latter.' 68 As
for the continued imbalance stemming from the former, "[i]f merit se-
lection works as it should, the surface 'imbalances' of the Carter judici-
ary may be insignificant in light of what will be recognized as the high
quality of judges on the bench."'
169
Jack J Coe, Jr.
than Republican judges, particularly in matters involving economic policy. Id. at 253. See,
e.g., Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. Sm. REV. 843
(1961); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of-4ppeal Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sc1.
REV. 491 (1975).
163. Goldman, supra note 60, at 247. See Schellhardt, Reshaping the Federal Judiciary,
Wall St. J., Feb. 23, 1978 at 26.
164. See note 160 supra and accompanying text.
165. Nelson, supra note 4, at 107. See also Rosenbaum, supra note 47, at 127.
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